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Note of Editor-in-Chief 
This is the first Special issue of the journal Culture e Studi del Sociale-CuSSoc. The idea behind the special 
issue comes from this consideration: around the world, individuals are facing a critical moment, the COVID-
19 pandemic and its consequences require some reflections on many topics, often forgotten by scholars. This 
is the reason why many Italian and foreign scholars have been invited to give their contribution. Further-
more, now more than ever, it is crucial to share knowledge coming from multiple disciplines and that’s why 
it was decided to write an entire issue in English. 
For scientific and intellectual correctness, the contents of single articles refer to the situation as in mid-May 
2020. It is necessary to clarify that because this Special issue was published when many countries were start-
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Disasters change individuals and the social structure. Two categories are essential to study 
disasters: time and space. To these, we should add risk that is a cultural object resulting 
from interpretation. Its representations are subjective and they stem from the socio-cultural 
framework of reference. In the article, we will apply  to the COVID-19 epidemic in Italy 
the four risk-related issues emerging by the interplay between the degree of knowledge 
(certain/uncertain) and that of consent (contested/complete) as in Douglas and Wildavsky.  
We will describe the four types of problems about the evaluation of the consequences con-
cerning this health risk and we will consider the role of institutions. Since disasters disrupt 
the regularity and predictability of everyday life, the temporal dimension individuals ex-
perience is flattened onto the present. Our conclusions reflect on the possibility to counter-
act this and on available tools to foresee when constructing a future after a disaster. 
 
Keyword: Disasters, Risk, COVID-19, Future, Resilience.  
 
 
1. The disruption of everyday life: Sorokin and disaster studies 
 
We will start from the idea that, in the current time, disasters are recursive. In 
addition, they impact greatly on many aspects of everyday life, from forms of 
thoughts to behaviours and from social life to societal cultural processes. Sociology 
is not new to disaster studies. The 1950s saw the publication of Sorokin’s Man and 
Society in Calamity (2010 [1942]), in which disasters (wars and revolutions, 
plagues and famine) were defined and identified withthe historical period.  
Today, the lexicon has changed (preferring the term “disaster” to “calamity”) 
but their effects, regardless of their nature, have not. While scholars disagree on 
which events should and/or can fall into this category, they all concede that disas-
ters upset the regularity of individuals’ daily lives. The category “disaster” is a very 
large container which includes many events; not just wars, plagues and natural dis-
asters (earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, health emergencies, etc.), but also events 
yielding a wide range of effects, changing individuals’ and societies’ normal flow 
of everyday life (Mangone, 2018a, 2019). Should not also a cyberattack, a terrorist 
attack or the thousands of migrants who continue to die in the Mediterranean, or on 
the border with Turkey, or the thousands of deaths due to the spread of viruses, be 
considered disasters? 
Sorokin defines the “typical effects” that occur every time disasters of the same 
type strike. He affirms: «The life of any society is an incessant fluctuation between 
periods of comparative well-being and those of calamity. [...] Sooner or later this 
                                                          
1 This article is the result of active collaboration among the authors. In the final version, Emiliana 
Mangone wrote paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, and Nikolay Zyuzev wrote paragraph 1.  
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phase is succeeded by a new stretch of well-being, which is replaced, in turn, by a 
further period of calamity. And so this alternation goes on, throughout the entire 
duration of society in question” (Sorokin, 2010[1942], p. 13). The Russian-
American sociologist then clarifies: «I would stress the general principle of the di-
versification and polarization of these effects in different parts of population. By 
this principle is meant that the effects of a given calamity are not identical - indeed, 
often are opposite - for different individuals and groups of the society concerned, 
since individuals and groups differ from one another biologically and psychoso-
cially» (Sorokin, 2010 [1942], p. 14). This also depends, of course, on the degree 
of exposure to the disaster. Different categories could be exposed to risk in varying 
degrees. Let us consider two examples: war and an epidemic particularly affecting 
the elderly population. In both cases, different categories experience the fear of dy-
ing in different degrees. In the case of war, the military and the population experi-
ence and face the same type of disaster, but differently (Gillespie, 1942) and the 
former fear of death is much higher. Similarly, in the case of a pandemic, the eld-
erly will fear death much more than the younger population. 
 The effects are not only on emotional aspects, such as fear, but also on the cog-
nitive processes of representation, memory, imagination and structuring of thought. 
The first change in this sense is «in the tendency of all the cognitive processes to be 
concentrated more and more upon the calamity and the phenomena that are di-
rectly and indirectly connected with it, together with increasing insensitivity (be-
ginning with sensation and perception) toward extraneous elements» (Sorokin, 
2010 [1942], p. 28). The second important change is: «in a tendency toward disin-
tegration of the unity of our “self” and of mental functioning. It manifests itself in 
an increasing incapacity to concentrate on objects unrelated to the calamity, in a 
growing dependence of our thinking upon fortuitous external influences; in a de-
creasing autonomy and self-regulation of our thoughts, independently of external 
stimuli; and, finally, in an access of various forms of mental disease. In brief, ca-
lamities promote the growth of mental disorderliness and disorganization» (So-
rokin, 2010 [1942], p. 35). These effects often weaken the self that tends to become 
amorphous and self-doubling, creating dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and different 
behaviours in the part of the population directly or indirectly involved in the disas-
ter. 
What Sorokin stated in the 1950s is still valid when describing the dynamics 
that occur in societies subjected to disasters. The crisis caused by disasters is not to 
be considered sui generis: it represents a normal moment in the life-flow that al-
lows for the recognition of the characteristics of social systems that might not oth-
erwise remain clouded, since the calamity generates social change and conse-
quences on both life and the socio-psychological regulatory mechanisms. 
The final chapter of Man and Society in Calamity is dedicated to the future (A 
Glance into the Future) and to what could be the means to exit the disaster-induced 
crisis (wars and revolutions, famines and pestilences) but also to the anarchy of 
values that can only be overcome with their greater integration and rooting. Conse-
quently, thinking about the future during or after a disaster cannot be separated 
from the existence of a community (Mangone, 2018b), or grouping of individuals 
that is configured as such, since it is from the relationships established within the 
communities, in themselves positive, that will stem the planning and the recon-
struction of the identity outfits and new system of needs and values. 
 Therefore, we need to highlight that the law of diversification and polarization 
of the effects of calamity is still valid today, and that, in disaster-prone communi-
ties, regardless of their nature, there is always a “before” and “after” (Van den 
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Eynde & Veno, 1999). Addressing the problem of overcoming the emergency be-
comes a priority. To this end, we should outline the dynamics characterizing the 
populations when a new order is being established (Mangone, 2018b).  
Disasters disrupt the networks of social relations making the definition of the 
social structure chaotic, a process that becomes a powerful factor of socio-cultural 
change. Among the many examples are the occurrences in enemy-occupied territo-
ries; those – such as those hosting refugee camps – that become the destination for 
the part of the population that migrated to escape the harmful effects of conflicts, 
famine, epidemics; those contaminated by chemical agents with the consequent ef-
fects on the population. More directly related to our topic, the quarantine of part of 
(or all) the population to reduce the effects of an epidemic. Disasters change 
greatly both individuals and the social structure. They generate the need to start 
again, to reconnect the life-threads of individuals and the community, thus trying to 
imagine a possible future, looking for a project that can bring out the whole com-
munity from a crisis (unbalanced) situation and channel it towards a new equilib-
rium. 
To understand the real consequences of a disaster for a community, beyond the 
victims and material damage, we should not stop at the actual moment of the disas-
ter but go further (to the “after”) and observe what happens in later years through 
various paradigmatic and disciplinary lenses. We should consider the persistent 
sense of uncertainty for the future experienced by people affected by the calamity, 
their regret for the loss of both assets and loved ones, their disorientation due to 
forced separation from everyday habits and the inability to recognize themselves in 
a given historical and cultural context. 
After many years, the lexicon has changed, preferring the term disaster to ca-
lamity but the effects that perturb the regularity of the daily life of individuals – on 
their thought, behaviour, social organization and cultural life – of the events that 
we call disasters have not. This is true even though scholars not always agree on 
which events should and/or could fall into this category2.  
Sorokin’s general principle thus anticipates the research approaches for study-
ing disasters from the 1980s, based on the closely interrelated concepts of social 
vulnerability (Phillips et al., 2010) and resilience (Manyena, 2006). As Sorokin 
maintained, the effects of calamities (disasters) are not the same for all individuals 
and their communities, and not just for the different direct or indirect involvement 
of individuals but also for the different types of disasters they are involved in.  
In light of Sorokin’s idea that «The life of any society is an incessant fluctuation 
between periods of comparative well-being and those of calamity» (2010[1942], p. 
14) and the subsequent law of diversification and polarization of calamities' effects, 
we can affirm that, to study disasters and their effects, time and space are two es-
sential social categories. They are also two distinctive and constitutive elements of 
the phenomenology related to disasters and the everyday lives of the individuals 
involved in them. These phenomena can be studied in their continuous unfolding, 
as they flow into the unity of the individual experience and situation; or they may 
become the subject of a subsequent reflection if we reflect on them after they have 
been experienced. In the first case, personal history coincides with experience and 
cannot be separated from it; in the second, instead, reflecting on past actions means 
                                                          
2 Disasters are usually divided into two broad categories: natural disasters (including epidemics) and 
man-made disasters. The latter, in turn, are divided into a) accidental, due to human error (e.g. de-
railment of a train due to driver error); b) intentional, such as murder and mass violence (war and ter-
rorism). 
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that they are treated as something disconnected from personal experience. In this 
way, time is no longer unitary, and being aware of this means that individuals are 
oriented in their actions/interactions by the temporal and spatial dimensions (social 
and historical context). 
In the 21st century, disasters have become much more complex than they previ-
ously were – although Sorokin had already highlighted the complex nature of these 
phenomena and the multiple consequences on the personal, cultural and social 
level. Consequently, we venture to formulate the following reflections: 1) all the 
disasters that occurred in the last decades and continue to happen have taught us 
that vulnerability is increasing (both for the transformations in nature – such as the 
effects of pollution – and for individual risk-seeking), which is why it is necessary 
to set up prevention and early intervention actions at a local, national and interna-
tional level; 2) the category of “disasters” should be considered virtual in the sense 
that it cannot encompass only events that are defined as disasters according to 
common sense (natural disasters, wars, terrorism, etc.) but also all those events en-
tailing conjunctions of physical conditions and social definitions of human harm 
and social disturbances (Kreps, 2001) such as epidemics. 
 
 
2. Disasters and risk: a symbolic-cultural reality 
 
Disasters and the development of humanity guide our reflections – necessary for 
a sociological reading of socio-cultural phenomena – towards the “risk culture” and 
the awareness of the risks taken to “colonize the future”. Giddens (1991) insisted 
that these dynamics lead to the individualisation of life. Personal identity has be-
come a reflexive project to be realized in its social environment, characterized both 
by strong technicality and moral dryness. We add, therefore, another element to the 
above-considered time: risk. By combining risk and time, we determine an idea of 
future in global society linked to the concept of uncertainty. Individuals have al-
ways tried to find sources of knowledge that would allow them to expand their de-
gree of certainty (security), but this need often remains unsatisfied. And it is pre-
cisely being besieged by fear that conditions individual decisions and often pushes 
people to fall back on sub-optimal but possible (more controllable) solutions rather 
than taking “risks” (less controllable).  
If social action is the key to understanding society, attitudes towards risk and 
the future do not appear to be dominated by purpose-oriented rationality. Rather, 
they appear to be dominated by a logic based on the search for a balance between 
cultural “goals” and “means”, starting from the selection of “cultural goals” on a 
hierarchical scale.  
There is no unequivocal definition of risk, nor there is a single approach for its 
analysis (Barbieri and Mangone, 2015): several disciplines have dealt with this is-
sue, each basing its contribution on its own peculiarities. When social sciences de-
cide to study the concept of “risk”, three authors come to the mind of researchers, 
and especially of sociologists: Luhmann (1991), Beck (1986) and Giddens (1990). 
To these, scholars who prefer approaches more focused on socio-cultural dimen-
sions and context add Douglas (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983). These are reputed 
to be key authors for the development of the analysis of this concept. 
The various definitions coined over the last few decades have not managed to 
make this concept clear, and it remains very ambiguous. On the one hand, people 
are attracted by risk or even fascinated by it; on the other hand, they are wary and 
fearful. The reason is that this concept is highly dependent on some aspects, among 
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which two stand out: on the one hand, the influence of culture and context, on the 
other, its inextricable link with other concepts (risk, uncertainty, confidence, secu-
rity, modernity, globalization, etc.). This indissoluble bond with other concepts un-
derpins the reflections by contemporary sociologists on this theme, starting from 
Luhmann (1991), who compellingly links risk to the ideas of probability and uncer-
tainty, differentiating it from the concept of danger. It is not possible to talk about 
risk when the result of an act is certain, and therefore primitive cultures had no 
knowledge of this concept. Hence the idea that risk is typical of modernity and 
should not be confused with hazard or peril. Rather, it indicates risky choices that 
are actively pursued in view of future possibilities (Giddens, 1990). What is con-
sidered risky (behaviour, practices, environments, etc.) depends on what Beck 
(1986) called “relations of definitions”. This means that every society, at a given 
time, determines its risk hierarchy; however, the perceptions (underpinning the 
construction of said hierarchy) do not always correspond to objectively measurable 
risks, nor they are generated by individual decisions. This is mainly because the at-
tention of the public has shifted towards needs related to the quality of life, due to 
both the influence of mass media and the overall increase in wealth. We thus shift 
from an approach reducing risk to its mere economic aspects to one considering the 
overall interactions between these and other important social and cultural variables.  
Culture is often overlooked in risk studies (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983), as it 
is not considered a problematic aspect of society but rather an “accident” in the 
regular course of social events. In such a complex scenario as the contemporary so-
ciety, relationships (at different levels) play a dominant role in both social phe-
nomena and the processes of social construal of risk – meaning how people per-
ceive, understand and interpret the world around them (Douglas 1997). 
It is thus easy to understand how the concept of risk has changed (and is still 
changing) in contemporary society, following the latter’s transformations. The 
transition from local to global society has generated the idea of “global risks”, 
which in turn has prompted the statement that this is the “risk society” (Beck, 
1986). We have adopted the idea that risk factors are not hidden only in nature 
anymore, but also in humans, their behaviours, their freedom, their relations, their 
association, the whole of society (Ewald, 1993). In the following pages, our atten-
tion will be focused on key elements of everyday life that must be considered when 
dealing with the processes of construction, identification, and selection of risks. 
Supported by the meso-range theories3 (Collins, 1988) developed in recent dec-
ades, that studied the relations between social system and lifeworld, we will there-
fore try to describe the links between risk, culture and social relations. 
 Culture is a fundamental dimension of everyday life and it is necessary to un-
derstand it in relation to the various situations of the social world, including those 
defined “risky”. In this way, we can theorize paths aimed at improving the relations 
and forms deriving from culture, through which we express the interactions among 
people as well as those between them and the other elements of the system. 
This interpretation of the relationship between risk and culture draws a complex 
scenario, in which the world and the people in it constitute an endless web of rela-
tionships based on events that intersect, overlap, influence each other – and that 
can also often be discordant (Festinger, 1962). The everyday sequence of events, 
through definition and elaboration, allows for the reproduction of “meaning” 
through “symbolic mediation”, which favours the interpretation and, more impor-
                                                          
3 The meso dimension, focused on the relationships between social system and lifeworld, where the 
latter is understood as the set of meanings and representations of culture. 
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tantly, the very construction of reality. Social reality – and, therefore, also the con-
struction, identification, and selection of risk – stems not only from the social 
meanings attributed to a certain phenomenon (cultural object) but also from the 
products of the subjective world of people. People’s patterns of action and relation-
ships are built according to the meaning that they attribute to daily existence. In 
other words, individuals achieve a world of meanings and events that become real 
for them as conscious and perceiving “social beings”. 
Risk is a reality for people, deriving from the relations that people establish 
with others and that are manifested through everyday roles. In general, risk can be 
considered a social problem because it stems from the relationship between “fact” 
and “structure”, it results from interpretation and therefore it is a cultural object. 
And precisely because risk is interpreted as a culturally defined social problem, 
over time its shared forms of representation can either increase or decrease. In such 
a scenario, risk representations express both the subjective sense attributed to this 
category and the cultural and social reference framework available at a given time 
and space (Schütz, 1932): construction and representations of risk exist both in the 
micro-everyday scene and in the macro-institutional one. 
On these premises, Mary Douglas (1985) argues that culture is a “mnemonic 
system” that helps people in calculating risk and consequences and shifts the focus 
from the idea of individual risk to that of collective risk. Of course, Douglas’ cul-
tural theory of risk should be seen in the broader context of her studies on primitive 
thought and taboos (Douglas, 1966), some of which are developed by linking them 
with modern human behaviour in risky and dangerous situations. This interpreta-
tion is based on the principle that in every place and age the universe is interpreted 
in moral and political terms (Douglas, 1992) and the concept of risk becomes 
paramount in this sense. In modern societies, however, risk does not perform the 
same function that danger covered in pre-modern ones. Contemporary societies 
typically replace “sin” with “risk”, because the processes of globalization have 
helped in establishing cultural systems able to integrate ever-larger communities – 
whose vulnerability, however, has increased precisely because they have become 
“world systems”. Douglas’ cultural-symbolic analysis is not limited to attempting 
to explain the influence of culture on the concept of risk: in her book Risk and Cul-
ture, co-authored with political scientist Wildavsky (Douglas and Wildavsky 
1983), she also deals with the issue of knowledge by stressing knowledge of risk(s) 
is never exhaustive. The scholar highlights four risk-related issues emerging by the 
interplay between the degree of knowledge (certain/uncertain) and that of consent 
(contested/complete). 
These connections generate four types of problems concerning the evaluation of 
the consequences when faced with a risk (Tab. 1). While three of them can be 
solved through specific actions, one remains unsolved. 
In the first situation, if we have certain knowledge and complete consent – 
among “laymen” rather than scientists – the problem is “technical” in its nature and 
can be solved by calculating the probability of the event, then choosing the alterna-
tive that produces the greatest positive effects. If we have uncertain knowledge and 
complete consent, instead, the problem is “informational” and therefore the solu-
tion is the search for further knowledge. Finally, if we have certain knowledge but 
controversies (contested consent), it is a problem of “disagreement” that must be 
solved through either coercion or discussion. 
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Tab. 1 – The four Problems of Risk 
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Coercion or Discussion 
Problem:  




Source: Douglas and Wildavsky (1983, p. 5) 
 
In the last situation, we have both uncertain knowledge and a dispute by the 
“laymen”, i.e., non-experts. In this case, the problem is no longer widening knowl-
edge, but of how to create consent around it, considering that the perception of risk 
is a social process that depends on the combination of “trust” and “fear”. There-
fore, there is no solution to the problem of combined uncertain knowledge and lack 
of consent because we face with a further problem concerning policies: the cultural 
approach can show us how the consent of the community in selecting certain risks 
is oriented by the public interest according to the strength and direction of social 
disapproval. This also shows how this selection changes together with the commu-
nity or social organizations in general, and how individuals who belong to different 
social organizations are willing to face some risks rather than others. As Douglas 
and Wildavsky write, «In risk perception, humans act less as individuals and more 
as social beings who have internalized social pressures and delegated their deci-
sion-making processes to institutions. They manage as well as they do, without 
knowing the risks they face, by following social rules on what to ignore:  institu-
tions are their problem-simplifying devices» (1983, p. 80). In their everyday lives, 
individuals try to avoid harmful events. To this end, they base their reasoning not 
on precise economic or probabilistic calculations but rather on conditions that al-
low them to overcome the crisis by identifying objectives that are tangible and 
flexible at the same time, often delegating this function to social organizations (in-
cluding the institutions).  
Although it appears static, the cultural-symbolic approach allows us to define, 
through the general cultural theory, the conceptual boundaries (Tansey and 
O’Riordan 1999) within which we can then review and redefine the social con-
strual processes. By doing so, we can add new tiles to the mosaic describing and 
interpreting the reality of the social dynamics connected with risk. However, the 
four issues posed by Douglas (1992) as the starting point for a comparative study 
of risk perception remain of primary importance. These are a) the influence of risk 
on the goals of the individual perceiving it; b) whether the original community is 
part (integral or not) of the individual’s goals; c) understanding the influence on the 
individual or collective good of the risk depending on the type of community; and 
finally, d) classifying the various communities based on the support, commitment, 
organization, and boundaries defined by their members. 
Summarizing, we can state that the cultural approach helps us to understand the 
perception of risk by non-experts through a systematic view of the range of objec-
tives that an individual may try to reach. In other words, risk should not be consid-
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ered a technical problem but rather a problem of everyday life for which we must 
take into account political implications and people’s positions in relation to both 
individual and collective objectives. 
 
 
3. The four problem of the COVID-19 epidemic risk in Italy 
 
In the previous pages we have highlighted the theoretical and methodological 
elements needed to study social dynamics and the symbolic-cultural reality with 
regard to how individuals combine certain aspects that permeate daily life, the idea 
of the future, uncertainty, risk, and, last but not least, the disasters that disturb the 
already precarious balance between all these aspects.  
From now on, we intend to correlate what previously said to the problems 
stemming from individual action during an epidemic, considering the risk factors 
that they involve for people’s health. The case examined will be the SARS-CoV-2 
virus or COVID-19 which is the name of the disease (better known simply as coro-
navirus). We will pay particular attention to Italy, the pandemic epicentre in 
Europe.  
On 8 December 2019 the World Health Organization (WHO) ascertained the 
first case of a patient infected by a new virus akin to SARS (Severe Acute Respira-
tory Syndrome). The latter spread between late 2002 and early 2003, representing 
the first major pandemic threat to the Western world in the 21st century, this virus 
caused serious respiratory crises and pneumonia and currently knows neither ther-
apy nor vaccine. To the disease of new virus (SARS-CoV-2) will be given the 
name COVID-19, from the words coronavirus (COVI) and disease (D) and the last 
two digits of the year of its spread (2019). A few months later, it will be discovered 
that China’s “patient zero” in the Hubei province was far from being the first case, 
as the virus had most probably started circulating in the region since mid-
November. When China raised the alarm on December 27, the spread in the Hubei 
province had already taken the form of an epidemic: hundreds of thousands of in-
dividuals had already become infected. Nevertheless, the situation was underesti-
mated and a few months later the virus will reach Europe with the first European 
(Italian) patient certified on February 21, 2020 (in the previous month, Italy also 
recorded two other cases concerning a couple of Chinese tourists). The thousands 
of infected people and the ease of transmission meant that, when the WHO de-
clared the pandemic status on March 11, 2020, the countries involved have become 
114 worldwide. 
The reality outlined in the first months leads to the hypothesis that both individ-
ual and institutional actions lack awareness on the COVID-19 problem in terms of 
the pandemic emergency and the health risk run by the population. After the first 
cases in Europe, governments and institutions acknowledged the need to address 
the problem in a decisive manner and switched to “risk-aimed” communication4 to 
contain the contagion. The most urgent issue is to build up knowledge for both 
“experts” and “laymen”, to affect their behaviour and attitudes. This can be 
achieved only by interweaving objective scientific information and training in self-
                                                          
4 We should distinguish between a “risk-themed” communication from a “risk-aimed” one. This dis-
tinction refers not only to the content but also to the relationship. The first, “risk-themed”, refers to 
the object of the communication, while the second, “risk-aimed”, to its specific recipient. To simplify, 
we could distinguish the communication event referring to risk by identifying two moments: the first 
of an informative nature (“risk-themed”, information process) and the second of a persuasive-
preventive-participative nature (“risk-aimed”, communication process). 
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responsibility (perception of oneself and others. These targeted interventions aim at 
building the foundations for a safe and responsible coexistence between all genera-
tions, regardless of their degree of vulnerability to the virus. These interventions 
cannot then be left to the media, which often aim at “sensationalist” information – 
sick-blaming and circumscribing the problem to certain categories or social groups, 
while nurturing in others the perception of being somehow shielded from the con-
tagion. Such an attitude of denial is usually problematic and particularly in this 
specific case. This brings us back to communication. In a situation in which emo-
tions run high and values and socio-cultural resources are deeply involved, com-
munication cannot be limited to mere informative interventions, as active changes 
in behaviour and lifestyles are necessary to reduce the risk of contagion. 
To better understand, we will apply to the COVID-19 epidemic what Douglas 
and Wildavsky (1983) said about the problem of knowledge: that about risk it is 
never exhaustive. We will also refer to Simon’s principle of bounded rationality 
(1983).  
As mentioned above, the scholars had identified four problems related to 
knowledge and risk by crossing two dimensions: the degree of certainty/uncertainty 
of knowledge and the degree of consent (contested/complete). We will apply this 
model to the COVID-19 epidemic in Italy, declining the four types of problems 
concerning the evaluation of the consequences in dealing with this health risk. In 
addition, we will take into account the role of institutions. Our analysis is divided 
into three phases, consisting of five timeframes: phase 0 (the initiation phase of the 
infection), phase 1 (the phase of full emergency with the growing number of in-
fected individuals), phase 2 (phase of slowdown of infection and gradual exit from 
the emergency) - however, this phase as conceived here does not correspond to the 
second official phase of the Italian government which was implemented in early 
May. The last two phases (phase 1 and phase 2) are both divided into a first stage 
and a second stage. As we are writing (April 2020), the phase 2 is considered par-
tially hypothetic trying to foresee the situation and the measures implemented, be-
cause when we has finished to write this article in Italy the emergency was not yet 
finish and the entire country was been in lockdown from 11 March to 4 May (in fat 
on March 11 the nation was proclaimed “red zone” – or “protected zone”, as the 
Prime Minister, Antonio Conte, rather puts it).  
In relation to the COVID-19 in Italy, for easier reading, we will propose two ta-
bles (Tab. 1 and Tab. 2), distinguished by the dimension of “complete” an “con-
tested” consent. Our discussion will be general and all-encompassing, as some 
stages see the juxtaposition of several problems at the same time. In the phase 0, 
for example, the condition of certain knowledge and complete consent (referred not 
to “experts” but to citizens) was never reached. Rather, in this phase there was a 
“problem of knowledge and consent” (uncertain knowledge/contested consent), as 
the uncertain knowledge led to oppositions among both “experts” and “laymen”, 
different stakeholders and local governments. It should be noted that the spread of 
the virus in Italy was initially recorded in the North-East of the country (Lombardy 
and Veneto) with the identification of two “red zones” (Codogno in Lombardy and 
Vo’ in Veneto) which were completely quarantined for two weeks (14 days is the 
incubation period of the virus according to virologists) suspending all activities and 
mobility from/to the two towns. Following Douglas’ scheme, this case presents un 
unsolvable problem from the point of view of risk. The actions must aim at creat-
ing consent around the existing knowledge since the perception of risk is a social 
process that depends on the combination of “trust” and “fear”. It follows that we 
are faced with a further problem concerning policies: Douglas’ cultural approach 
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shows us how the consent of the community in selecting certain risks is oriented by 
the public interest according to the strength and direction of social disapproval. 
 
Tab. 1 – Relationship between the degree of certainty/uncertainty of knowledge and complete consent 
 
  Knowledge 





























Citizens confused by the lack of clarity 
in institutional communication  
Solution: Research  
Search for information on the risk of 
contagion and possible negative conse-














Need to contain the infection 
Solution: Probabilities calculus  
Calculation of the contagion rates 
















Information to the population are in-
sufficient and unclear about the future  
Solution: Research 
Search for appropriate shared actions 
















In the next phase (phase 1, first stage), more than one of Douglas’ conditions 
occurred simultaneously: there is both a “problem of disagreement” and an “infor-
mational” problem. On the one hand, there was “full consensus” about the virus’ 
extreme infectiousness, with requests for quarantine. On the other hand, local insti-
tutions and stakeholders disagreed, favouring profit and productivity over reducing 
risk of contagion. As a counterbalance, the vast majority of the population was be-
ginning to express consensus on actions to contain the contagion, despite the lack 
of clarity in institutional communication. 
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Tab. 2 - Relationship between the degree of certainty/uncertainty of knowledge and contested consent 
 
  Knowledge 
















Problem: Knowledge and consent 
Lack of clarity from the “experts” on the 
dangerousness of the contagion, leading 
to opposing positions on both the institu-
tional and the scientific side. 
Solution: ???? 
Underestimation of the risk of contagion 












Request for risk containment actions by 
“experts”. 
Opposition by the citizens (deprived of 
their freedom) and local institutions be-
cause of the possible economic repercus-
sions. 
Solution: Coercion or discussion  
Establishment of “red areas” in some re-















Lack of agreement on the establishment 
of the “red zones”. 
Soluzione: Coercion or discussion 
Further implementation of coercive ac-
tion. 
Proclamation of the whole of Italy as a 


























Problem: Knowledge and consent 
Lack of clarity on the part of the Euro-
pean Community and national political 
institutions on the actions to be taken for 
recovery. 
Solution: ???? 
Implementation of the appropriate poli-
cies for the economic, social and cultural 
recovery of Italy. 
 
 
The “technical” problem emerges in the second stage of the phase 1, as it is now 
clear to all parties involved that the virus is highly contagious and dangerous, espe-
cially for the weakest among the population. The solution translates into the simple 
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calculation of the probability of virus spread in order to allow the choice of the best 
alternative for its containment that produces the greatest positive effects for the en-
tire population. In this same phase (phase 1, second stage), however, there is also a 
further “disagreement problem”. Although the consequences and the pattern in 
which COVID-19 spreads are now clear, the first containment action have been ill-
received by part of the population, who saw their freedom of movement curbed. 
Faced with these forms of dispute, the authorities had to resort to coercion and 
force compliance with directives through checks by the police or the army. It was 
in this stage that the whole country was proclaimed a “protected zone” (red zone). 
As anticipated the phase  2 – being the phase of slowdown of infection and 
gradual exit from the emergency – is here considered hypothetically for the reasons 
specified above, still taking into account what happened in the previous phases. 
Also in this case, a first and a second stage can be distinguished: in the first stage, 
an “informational” one (uncertain knowledge and complete consent) basically due 
to a high degree of uncertainty for the future perceived by the population (the ac-
tual moment of the recovery of social and economic life is not yet known), also be-
cause the institutions are lacking or ambiguous in transmitting information - espe-
cially on the emergency closure times. In this case, being maximum confidence in 
the institutions because, given the situation - there is no alternative, the solution of 
the problem and the search for actions that can reduce the sense of uncertainty of 
the population. In this case, as confidence in the institutions is high (since, given 
the situation there is no alternative), the solution to the problem is to seek actions 
that can reduce the sense of uncertainty of the population; in the second stage, in-
stead,  the problem is that of “knowledge and consent” since there is (as is physio-
logical) lack of clarity on the part of the political institutions on the actions to be 
implemented for the recovery. This is true for both the European Union (the first 
signs of this were recorded with the opposition of some countries to the issuance of 
Eurobonds to cover the heavy debts faced by some states to counter the epidemic), 
which will have to face a generalised economic crisis (as well as crisis of other na-
ture), and national government. We are no longer talking about risk but about crisis 
management. Therefore, the solution is adopting the appropriate policies for the 
economic, social and cultural recovery of the nation. 
These dynamics show how the same social problem (the Coronavirus-related 
risk) is perceived differently by the community or social organisations in general 
even with respect to time, and how individuals who are part of different social or-
ganisations (e.g. stakeholders, such as industrialists or commercial operators who 
base their activities on profit) are willing to take some risks rather than others. In-
dividuals try to minimise harmful events, first for themselves and then for others – 
as the survival instinct is first individual and then collective. To do this they do not 
rely on economic or probabilistic calculations, but on conditions that allow them to 
overcome the crisis situation by identifying tangible and, at the same time, flexible 
objectives, often delegating this function to institutions.  
The model presented is obviously an artifice to simplify the dynamics of social 
construal experienced by an entire population during the complex process of con-
struction, identification and selection of risks, as well as how to deal with it. In in 
synthesis, we could say that with the help of the cultural approach – presented in 
the previous pages – we can understand how the “laymen” perceive the risk by of-
fering a systematic vision of the very wide range of objectives that the individual 
tries to achieve. The various social parties (stakeholders) produce different social 
representations (world ideas) and, therefore, different cultural reference systems 
become the frames within which to interpret attitudes towards risk and the attribu-
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tion of responsibility.  
In other words, risk and health risk in the case of COVID-19 cannot be ad-
dressed exclusively as a technical problem, but rather as a problem in the daily life 
of individuals for which we should consider both the political and economic impli-




4. Future, community, and resilience 
 
The sociological reflections here presented starting from Sorokin’s theories 
have highlighted that the daily experiences of individuals in emergency or risk 
situations can be perceived – and therefore studied – in their continuous unfolding, 
as they flow within the unity of the individual experience and situation; or, they 
can become the object of subsequent reflection when reflecting on them after they 
have been experienced. In the first case, personal history coincides with the experi-
ence and cannot be separated from it; for disasters it has been said that there is a 
“before” and an “after”. In the second case, instead, reflecting on past actions 
means that they are considered disconnected from personal – for example, the sur-
vivors of a disaster. In the case of the COVID-19 in Italy, at the height of the 
emergency the number of deaths had already exceeded the total number of victims 
recorded in China at the end of the emergency. On March 21, 2020, 793 deaths 
were recorded in a single day, with an average age of 80 years, a sort of “genera-
tion gap” that the virus created (almost all the victims were over 65 years old). 
Thus, time is no longer unitary and becoming aware of this means that individuals 
are oriented in their actions/interactions by the temporal and spatial dimension (so-
cial and historical context).  
In the case of disasters, the temporal dimension and in particular the idea of the 
“after”, the future, the life of the survivor is of considerable importance, whether 
they are natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, typhoons, epidemics, etc.) or pro-
duced intentionally or accidentally by humans (wars, terrorist attacks, chemical ac-
cidents, etc.) whose primary effects are the destruction of material goods as well as 
human lives. Thus, after a disaster causing widespread destruction (as is the case 
for COVID-19 in Italy), the question that everyone asks is: can there still be a fu-
ture? 
Some years ago, the anthropologist Marc Augé, published a pamphlet entitled 
Où est passé l’avenir ? (2008), in which he asked what had happened to the future, 
highlighting its main paradoxes. The question posed by this scholar had no refer-
ence to disasters, trying instead to find an answer to the prevailing idea of contem-
porary society living on immanence. Our purpose is to start from the paradox that 
every individual exists in a time following their birth and preceding their death (fi-
nite and infinite) to arrive at the idea that, despite their finitude, individuals can still 
imagine a future dimension of time and consequently act – or not act – conse-
quently even after having experienced a disastrous event accompanied by the need 
to grieve. 
Time is a polysemic concept and is inseparable from individual actions. And 
yet, for many years it has been considered an unproblematic aspect of everyday life 
(Adam, 1995, 2004). The scientific traditions that addressed time are, on the one 
hand, philosophy, with the idea of the linear or circular time (individual times), 
and, on the other hand, the physical and natural sciences, up to Einstein’s relativity 
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and quantum physics (natural times). Between these two lies the sociological re-
search, that tried to mediate between the minuteness of the first and the magnitude 
of the second (Ricœur, 1991) by focusing the attention on “social or collective 
time”, which is linked to all aspects of everyday life (psychological, social and cul-
tural ones). However, a social reading of time in the global society requires the 
analysis of temporal cultures. 
It should be pointed out that there are different social models and practices in-
herent to time. According to philosophical tradition, there is a chronological time 
(Chrónos), consisting of a measurable triad that represents its quantitative aspect: 
past (yesterday), present (today) and future (tomorrow). In the case of disasters, 
this conception is reduced almost and exclusively to the present because in the im-
mediacy one only tries to get out of the social and institutional emergency deter-
mined by the disaster as soon as possible and then tries to activate actions of the 
community aimed at re-constructing its future and that of individuals. Uncertainty 
in the biographies of individuals who have escaped a disaster leads them not to de-
sign a long-term project, thus to a contraction in the “duration” of the temporal ho-
rizons (Leccardi, 2014) which makes individuals focus on the present.  
Kairós (time of action) consists instead in the opportunity that can happen at 
any given time, the so-called “right time, opportune time, time for”. If Chrónos 
represents the “time of truth” and the quantitative dimension (measurability and 
duration), Kairós represents the qualitative dimension of time, related to the search 
for meaning in human action (“time of action”). In ancient times Kairós was domi-
nated by fate, but if stripped of this magical halo it allows the understanding of 
many dynamics of contemporary society. Kairós allows us to state that, both in in-
dividual and collective experience, time is not uniform: it does not have the same 
value at different moments and junctures, nor over the same day. This impacts on 
everyday activities and on the forms that individuals adopt to communicate. This 
fragmentation and temporal acceleration that characterize contemporary society 
(Rosa and Scheurman, 2009) – starkly evident in the case of disasters – entails the 
need to redetermine the relationship between biographical and social times in a 
community whose imminence is to escape the emergency, flattening everything out 
onto the present. It follows that the experience of time not only differs from indi-
vidual to individual and from society to society in their everyday activities but is 
also different for those who survived a disastrous event. 
If one can imagine a future dimension of time by individuals who survived a 
disaster, these two models of temporal cultures (Chrónos and Kairós) merge. This 
because Chrónos refers to the present, to a “forced culture of immanence”, which 
in turn brings individuals back to the ancient idea of Kairós that bound them to 
fate. While it is true that individuals act with respect to the future based on instru-
mental rationality, they very often give in to fatalism. In other words, the experi-
ences of time (temporal cultures) in everyday life – beyond common aspects such 
as it measurement – affect individuals differently because they are a symbolic me-
diation between society and individual subjectivity, outlining, time after time, new 
time horizons on which to base the decisions for future projects. 
Trying to draw conclusions from the above reflections, we can say that: a) the 
dimension of time – in a social context that has experienced a disaster and is still 
experiencing its effects – should be reordered in its cultures (Chrónos and Kairós) 
in relation to the disrupted everyday social life (e.g. the many irresponsible Italians 
not complying with the order to stay at home to minimize the possibility of conta-
gion). The relevant aspects of a process of this magnitude mainly involve the social 
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and individual dimensions – see Beck (1986) when he underlines the aspects char-
acterizing the individualisation of human life. On the one hand, there is a dissolu-
tion of pre-established forms of social life and, on the other, new institutional 
claims, controls and constraints for individuals; b) individuals tend – for their own 
preservation and reproduction – to look for ways to reduce the uncertainty that flat-
tens the dimension of time to the present, shortening the “temporal horizons”. So-
cial relations, in their daily unfolding, contain both relations with the other and re-
lations with the institutions; the picture emerging from the above reflection (includ-
ing the example of the social construal of the COVID-19 epidemic in Italy) shows 
that individuals are conditioned by the perception of the condition they are experi-
encing.  
If these are the conditions of the individual trying to escape the emergency 
situation, the theory of rational choice is not applicable to the dynamics connected 
to “future time”.  Rather, they could embrace a model of choice closer to that of 
bounded rationality (Simon, 1983). The bounded rationality model holds the fol-
lowing aspects as its general scheme of execution: a) individual decision do not 
concern the whole of human life, but consider only limited areas of it; b) when in-
dividuals makes a choice, even a very important one, they do not consider future 
scenarios but look at the present and at most to possible perspectives; c) the very 
fact that the individual is seeking the solution to a problem, causes her to focus on 
certain aspects of his life rather than others; d) a major part of the individual’s ef-
forts in a choice is absorbed by frantically collecting information and facts about 
the decision in question (problem of knowledge).  
In the bounded rationality model, individuals do not project themselves in time 
indefinitely (the future time horizon may be longer or shorter). In the everyday re-
ality of an individual experiencing an emergency and health risk situation, as in the 
case of COVID-19, or who survived a disaster, the environment in which they live 
is divided into separate and distinct problems. To apply the bounded rationality 
model, the individual needs to be able to focus his or her attention to the factors 
that deserve it from time to time. The ability to acquire knowledge of the situations 
and environment in which individuals live is necessary both to facilitate the crea-
tion of alternatives and to estimate the possible consequences, allowing the indi-
vidual to preserve the image of that part of the world involved in his decisions and 
to set her decision (action) on the basis of that image, which should aim not at his 
or her own well-being but to the well-being of every individual in the community. 
The latter which is re-evaluated in the case of disaster-stricken territories. 
In recent decades, when reflecting on how communities overcome disasters, the 
focus is not only directed to the lacks and losses, but also to the ability of individu-
als and communities to adapt and grow despite the critical conditions.  
The concept of “community”, which seemed to be abandoned, is being greatly 
revived as regards the possibility to explain the changes and the interventions in a 
territory. today a new form of community, understood as collective intelligence, 
must be rebuilt if you want to start escape routes from a disaster in a territory. This 
is because collective intelligence has to be intended as a form of intelligence dis-
tributed everywhere, constantly improved and coordinated in real time, leading to a 
real mobilization of resources and competences of a specific context. It is based on 
people’s acknowledgement and mutual enrichment, not on the worship of “fet-
ished” communities (Lévy, 1994). Policymakers who aim to start a territorial sus-
tainable development have to facilitate and enhance the creation of “communities”, 
as they are fundamental structures in which it is important “to think about”: they 
represent the “factory” of a territorial human and social capital (territorial intelli-
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gence).  
Therefore, the word “community” in a global society does not have a negative 
sense, as the community considers individuals in their plenitude and not in one of 
the roles they have to play in the society. It is a whole of experiences and thoughts, 
tradition and engagement, participation and willingness, and at the same time it en-
hances the social dimension of the existence, the sense of belonging to a common 
destiny - the case of the COVID-19 epidemic is just one of these moments, the 
whole community belongs to a common destiny without any distinction from indi-
vidual to individual. 
The key concept is that of resilience (Manyena, 2006) which is generally de-
fined as the ability of an individual or group to return to their normal life after cata-
strophic events (Bonanno, 2004; Bonanno et al., 2006). This can be considered on 
two levels: a personal level (how the person is and how he or she responds to the 
events), and a situational one. 
The situational level turns the spotlight onto the community and, in particular, 
the concept of resilient communities (Norris et al., 2008) that is bound to the 
concept of social capital and the meaning the latter takes in the process of building 
resilience along with other components that contribute to the adaptation to a 
disturbance. Through the community are affirmed social commitment, respect of 
rights and freedom, the balance between needs and civic responsibilities as well as 
the reconstruction of satisfying relationships among individuals. These features 
would allow for defense from exclusion processes: the resilient community 
becomes an instrument of action if it is considered as an “open space” in which 
environmental and social networks are interrelated, to ensure sustainable 
development initiatives and social protection. According to Norris and colleagues 
(ibidem) resilience stems from resources in the community: a) economic 
development; b) social capital; c) information and communication; d) the 
competence of the community. And in this sense, the role that social capital 
assumes becomes of fundamental importance. This concept, due to its 
interconnections with many other elements of society, contributes to a greater 
extent to the construction of a community that is the protagonist of its rebirth. 
This new model to govern and manage the community to escape from the emer-
gency situation in the aftermath of a disaster can be put into effect only by mobiliz-
ing social resources, relations and opportunities. In other words, this process de-
pends on and needs the social capital of such territory. The term social capital was 
introduced by Loury (1977, 1987) who meant by it all the resources existing within 
family relations and the community social organization that come to be useful for 
individuals’ development- even Bourdieu (1979) saw it from this perspective. De-
spite that, we should stress that we owe the most important contribution to the 
definition of the concept of social capital to Coleman (1990), who argues that it «is 
created when relations among people change in ways that facilitate action» and it is 
not tangible because «it is embodied in the relations among peoples» (ibid., p. 
304). Such relations can be seen as forms of capital because like other capitals they 
produce material and symbolical value; in fact, the value of social capital is inher-
ent in the fact that it «identifies certain physical objects by their function, disre-
garding differences in form, appearance, and construction. The function identified 
by the concept “social capital” is the value of those aspects of social structure to 
actors, as resources that can be used by the actors to realize their interests» (ibid., 
p. 305). 
In the last decades, analyses of territories have relied mainly on the explanation 
based upon the concept of social capital. This is because such concept has no clear-
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cut boundaries, since social capital is made up of trust relations (strong and weak, 
extended and interconnected) apt to improve the ability to recognize and under-
stand each other, to exchange information, to help each other and to cooperate for 
common purposes. Such formal and informal reciprocity relations are anyhow re-
gulated by norms that define the form, contents and boundaries of exchanges in a 
more or less flexible way and are made effective by sanctions for the individual 
that are either inner or outer. This relations network is the intentional or uninten-
tional product of social investment strategies oriented towards the establishment 
and reproduction of social relations that can be used over time, namely lasting and 
useful relations able to yield material and symbolical profits. Such relations im-
prove the capacity for action of the individual and collective actor and, if extended 
enough, even the social system’s capacity for action. 
Social capital inherently contains a view of development that is not confined to 
economic aspects but is linked to the degree of civicness (Putnam, 1992) and com-
munity freedom and above all to adopting correct behaviours based on trust (Fu-
kuyama, 1995). All these elements refer to belonging and reciprocity. The social 
capital, by involving directly social actors in exiting a crisis, stimulates individuals’ 
urge to be at the centre of attention through actions leading to a shared path to-
wards a common objective (well-being). Social capital appears to be a “multiplier 
of the possible”: it has a meaning only if it is aimed at ‘multiplying’ its potential, 
that is, at producing and reproducing itself.  
It could be said that the social, value-related, cultural, relational component can 
represent the multiplier of well-being without which any piece of work, structure, 
service and so on is sterile or perceived as unimportant. Within this perspective, 
acting with becomes paramount. In this way, the community in its territory is not 
merely an abstract notion: it is a place of production and produces itself. The com-
munity assumes its identity through the social capital that constitutes new reciproc-
ities between individuals and territory.  
The social capital for its intangibility and it is generating of collective benefits it 
hasn’t to be considered a property of actors, but it has to be considered as a “public 
good” (Coleman, 1990) and therefore it must be protected as such: to build up so-
cial capital instead of wasting it one path only must be followed to strengthen so-
cial ties through trust and empowerment; this is the only way in which even territo-
ries that may seem, at a superficial glance, “hopeless” would become productive 
locations and producers themselves of development processes allowing the com-
munity to survive and to improve its quality of life.  
In conclusion, a world free of disasters is not conceivable, but we can imagine a 
world in which the negative consequences of these events are minimized or even 
avoided starting from the assumption that collective damage requires collective 
strategies. As Sorokin argued, the future of mankind and its development are in the 
hands of mankind itself (1958): neither law nor education, nor religion or the econ-
omy, or science – even though the latter has a specific role in accompanying the 
processes of improving the lives of individuals and communities – can be enough 
for this task. This task is assigned to the whole of mankind, and therefore to its 
communities that can exist only if they have certain characteristics: «A peaceful, 
harmonious, and creative society can exist only when its members possess at least a 
minimum of love, sympathy, and compassion ensuring mutual aid, co-operation, 
and fair treatment. Under these conditions, its members are united in one collective 
‘we’ in which the joys and sorrows of one member are shared by others» (Sorokin 
1948, p. 57). Acting on the community means acting on multiple levels (individual, 
family, institutional and social), and it is the whole community the object of since a 
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normalization process of the community needs to be undertaken by reinforcing the 
existing networks and structures, reestablishing the previous ones and creating new 
ones. 
Of whatever nature and origin the disasters are, they face humanity with a di-
lemma still to be resolved: “By the mysterious forces of destiny mankind is con-
fronted with a stern dilemma: either to continue its predatory policies of individual 
and tribal selfishness that lead it to its inevitable doom, or to embark upon the poli-
cies of universal solidarity that brings humanity to the aspired for heaven on the 
earth. It is up to everyone of us which of the two roads we prefer to choose” (Soro-
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